






























































This paper studies delegation without monetary transfers when the number of
possible states is small, and therefore ﬁnite. To do so, we fully characterize the class of
optimal delegation sets in the ﬁnite-state version of Holmstrom’s (1984) seminal model
and analyze their properties. Our ﬁnite state assumption entails the following results:
(i) the agent never takes her ideal decision, and takes a decision strictly between her
and the principal’s ideal (thus compromising with the latter) in low enough states; (ii)
the agent takes the same decision in high enough states, and is indiﬀerent between
the decision she takes and the next highest decision in every other state; (iii) the
agent may be induced to take decisions outside the support of the principal’s ideal
decisions; (iv) marginal increases in the agent’s bias do not (generically) cause optimal
delegation sets to shrink, and may increase the variance of the decision taken by the
agent. We also show that the principal and the agent may both be better oﬀ if the
latter cannot distinguish between some states.
Keywords: Optimal delegation, ﬁnite states, Ally Principle, expertise
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper studies delegation without money transfers when the number of possible states
of the world is ﬁnite. The following example illustrates our model. It is widely believed
that juries are unduly biased towards reaching some verdict (rather than hanging), and
that they may therefore compromise by convicting on some lesser charge when evidence on
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1a more serious charge is unclear.1 Accordingly, juries are instructed to convict a defendant
on a charge only if they agree that the oﬀense was committed.2 For instance, if jurors
believe that the defendant may have committed murder but deﬁnitely did not commit
manslaughter then they may not convict on the lesser charge. The judge’s instruction
addresses the jury’s bias, relative to the presumption of innocence, by restricting the
verdicts which the jury may reach, inducing the jury to pool on acquittal unless the
evidence proves guilt on some charge beyond a reasonable doubt.
One can think of this situation as an optimal delegation problem without monetary
transfers in which the principal is the judge and the jury is the expert agent: expert, in
the sense that its role is fact-ﬁnding. The uninformed principal (he) oﬀers a delegation
set — namely, a collection of scalar decisions (the permissible verdicts) — to the biased
agent (she), who takes one of these decisions after observing the state (the evidence). All
of these features appear in the literature on optimal delegation initiated by Holmstrom
(1984). Almost all of this literature also supposes that the set of possible states is an
interval and, therefore, an inﬁnite set – we discuss the exceptions below. In the jury
example, there may be many feasible decisions (lesser charges), but there is only a ﬁnite
number of possible states: the evidence either clearly exonerates, or clearly inculpates the
defendant of murder, or identiﬁes the crime as murder but leaves the defendant’s factual
guilt in doubt.
The aim of this paper is to study optimal delegation when the number of states is
small, and therefore ﬁnite. One might conjecture that the distinction between ﬁnite and
an interval support of states is only a mathematical detail, and that no further insight
can be gained by studying delegation models with a ﬁnite set of states. Our results reveal
that such an impression is wrong. Analysis of the ﬁnite-state case is important not only
because it describes situations that are clearly realistic, but also because ﬁniteness of the
set of states generates new and interesting properties of the optimal delegation set (ODS,
for short). These turn on the principal’s ability to exploit the distance between the agent’s
ideal decision across states.
In order to emphasize the role of a small number of states in optimal delegation,
we analyze Holmstrom’s (1984) seminal model of optimal delegation in an environment
with a ﬁnite number of states. Holmstrom assumes that the principal’s and the agent’s
preferences are each represented by loss functions which are quadratic around the player’s
ideal decision. The principal’s ideal decision is simply the realization of the state, while the
agent’s ideal decision is b higher: b>0 is the agent’s bias. The agent observes the actual
realization of the state; the principal does not, but believes that it is uniformly distributed
on [0,1].3 Holmstrom shows that the ODS then has a simple structure, which has been
exploited in a number of applications. We extend Holmstrom’s model by retaining all of
1See Hannaford-Agor et al (2002) pp 42-43 for ﬁeld evidence in support of this possibility.
2See Stein v. NY 346 US (1953) on jury instructions and compromise verdicts. According to Beck v.
Alabama 447 US (1980), juries need only be instructed to consider a lesser oﬀense if there is evidence that
it might have been committed. Hoﬀheimer (2006) discusses these issues.
3This is the benchmark example in Crawford and Sobel’s (1982) cheap talk model. The optimal deleg-
ation problem is equivalent to a cheap talk game in which the Receiver moves ﬁrst by committing to the
decisions he will take in response to any message.
2these assumptions except for the uniformly distributed state. Instead, we assume that
the state is equally likely to take each of a ﬁnite number of equi-distanced values; so our
model approximates Holmstrom’s when we let the number of states tend to inﬁnity. Their
simplicity notwithstanding, maintaining Holmstrom’s assumptions on preferences and the
distribution of states has three major advantages. First, our approach allows us to derive
a full and tractably simple characterization of the class of ODSs which, like Holmstrom’s
model, can be used in applications (cf. Sections 5 and 6 below). Second, and more
importantly, some of the properties of the ODS we want to emphasize can be obtained
by relaxing assumptions other than the interval support, but are never satisﬁed under
Holmstrom’s original model. Hence, retaining all of Holmstrom’s assumptions except
for the interval support enables us to identify ﬁniteness of the number of states as the
origin of our results. Finally, analysis of ﬁnite-state delegation problems naturally raises
combinatorial issues. These issues can be surmounted with Holmstrom’s assumptions: we
not only fully characterize the ODS, but also show that it has a simple structure (which
we describe below).4
Characterizing ODSs in this ﬁnite environment, we show that they satisfy the following
properties:
Compromise. In every state, the agent takes a decision which is strictly less than
her ideal decision in that state. In low enough states, the agent’s decision exceeds the
principal’s decision in that state, and therefore represents a compromise between the two
players’ interests in such states. This stands in radical contrast to Holmstrom’s (1984)
result, where the agent takes her ideal decision in every low enough state.5
The chain property and top loading. In common with Holmstrom’s model, the
agent takes the same decision in all high enough states, and otherwise separates: a property
which we call top loading. If the agent is biased enough then the ODS consists of a single
decision; otherwise, and in contrast to Holmstrom (1984), the agent is indiﬀerent in low
states between the decision she takes and the next highest decision in the ODS (the chain
property). The chain property implies that the principal must exclude some intermediate
decisions (as in our example of judicial instructions) as well as some decisions above the
ODS. Gailmard (2009) p26 notes that the FTC, like other agencies, is typically limited
to up-down choices; Szalay (2005) p1174 mentions several other examples. By contrast,
Holmstrom’s principal need only exclude decisions above the ODS (cf. Melumad and
Shibano (1991)).6
Extreme decisions. In Holmstrom’s model, the principal only allows the agent to
take decisions which are ideal for the principal in some state. (See Holmstrom (1984)
and Melumad and Shibano (1991).). By contrast, we show that, for an interval of biases,
4The combinatorial issues resolve into a taxonomy which turns on the parities of the number of states
and the number of decisions in the ODS. Analysis of delegation problems with interval support raises other
issues, such as existence of an ODS (which is not an issue here). Such problems are also surmountable in
Holmstrom’s model.
5In both models, the agent may take a decision below the principal’s ideal in high enough states: e.g.
w h e nt h eb i a si ss og r e a tt h a tt h eO D Si sas i n g l e t o n .
6Martimort and Semenov (2006), Alonso and Matouschek (2008) and Gailmard (2009) provide other
general conditions for this result; Kovac and Mylovanov (2009) and Goltsman et al (2009) prove that
principal does not gain from oﬀering mixtures of decisions in Holmstrom’s benchmark model.
3the agent takes a decision in the highest state which exceeds the principal’s ideal in that
(or any other) state. This result suggests a possible explanation for the tenure system:
the university/principal forces the dean/agent to oﬀer unduly generous terms to good
candidates to motivate her to dismiss bad candidates.
Variations in bias and discretion. The theory also provides simple predictions
about how variations in the bias aﬀect the ODS. Unsurprisingly, a higher bias makes
delegations less valuable to the principal. However, in contrast to Homstrom’s model,
increases in bias do not cause the ODS to shrink (except for non-generic values of the
bias). Instead, a marginal increase in bias raises all decisions in the ODS whenever bias
is low enough for delegation to be valuable, and high enough that the principal cannot
achieve his ﬁrst best. In addition, and again contrary to Holmstrom’s model, the variance
of decisions may increase with the bias.
Expertise. We end the paper by applying our results to a model in which the principal
chooses the agent’s expertise (or which agent to appoint) before oﬀering a delegation set.
A recent literature, which explores the trade-oﬀ between loyalty and competence, relies on
the supposition that the principal prefers to appoint the more expert of two agents with a
common bias (cf. Gailmard and Patty (2007) and Huber and McCarty (2004) Proposition
3). This property holds trivially in models (like Bendor and Meirowitz (2004)), which
treat an amateur as an agent who does not observe the state with positive probability.
By contrast, we treat an amateur as an agent who is unable to distinguish between a
subset of states. The principal cannot gain by appointing an amateur if the bias is low
enough because the expert would take almost ﬁrst-best decisions in every state, whereas
an amateur must be less state-sensitive. He can also not gain from appointing an amateur
if the bias is large enough that delegation to an expert has no value. However, the property
fails for every intermediate bias, in the sense that the principal strictly prefers to appoint
some amateur over an expert with the same bias. This result holds whenever there are at
least four states and, therefore, also holds in Holmstrom’s model. Consequently, evidence
that political appointees are less expert (cf. Lewis (2007)) does not imply that there is a
trade-oﬀ between loyalty and competence.
If the expert can be outperformed, which amateur would the principal appoint from a
pool of candidates with common bias? We address this question when there are up to ﬁve
states. In all cases, the best amateur cannot distinguish between two succeeding states.
With ﬁve states, this pair moves upward (towards higher states) and then downward as
the bias increases.
We also consider an analogous question from the agent’s point of view. Suppose that
the agent can (publicly) commit not to distinguish between some states before being oﬀered
a delegation set. Consider, for example, a defense attorney (the agent) who observes the
state by asking questions of her client, but has divergent interests (akin to the bias) in
the sense that she must report intended perjury to the court. The attorney can then
commit to being an amateur in our sense by not asking unduly detailed questions. We
show that the principal and the agent may both prefer that the agent is some amateur
rather than the expert for a range of bias, and that the same amateur may be best for
both the principal and the agent. On the other hand, computations for low numbers of
states reveal that the agent prefers to be an expert when the principal would appoint an
4expert, but not conversely.
Related literature
Although the literature on optimal delegation is now too large to survey exhaustively, we
brieﬂy explain the paper’s relationship to a few of the most closely related game-theoretic
contributions.
We have already mentioned the main results from Holmstrom’s (1984) interval support
model as benchmarks against which to gauge the impact of a ﬁnite state variable in our
model. Melumad and Shibano (1991) generalize Holmstrom’s results proving, inter alia,
that delegation is an optimal mechanism: a property which also holds in our model.
Various other papers have characterized the ODS in variants on Holmstrom’s model
(with interval support), demonstrating that some of his conclusions may fail under dif-
ferent assumptions. Both Alonso and Matouschek (2008) and Szalay (2005) show that
the principal may exclude some intermediate decisions when the support of states is an
interval. Alonso and Matouschek (2008) show that the ODS might not be an interval with
more general preferences if the agent’s ideal decisions are insuﬃciently state-sensitive. This
motive is absent in our model because a state-independent bias precludes any conﬂict over
state-sensitivity. In Szalay (2005), the principal may exclude intermediate decisions to
induce costly information acquisition, whereas expertise is ﬁx e di no u rm a i nm o d e l .D e -
cisions are two-dimensional in Koessler and Martimort (2009), but the support of states is
an interval. Unlike the principal, the agent has diﬀe r e n tb i a s e si ne a c hd i m e n s i o n ,w h i c h
allows the principal to screen the agent by distorting each dimension away from the agent’s
ideal decision. They show that an agent with any bias takes a diﬀerent decision-pair in
each state, but does not take her ideal decision on either dimension in any state. By
contrast, our model (and Holmstrom’s) precludes such screening. The agent does not take
her ideal decisions because the ODS induces her to compromise with the principal in every
state when the support is ﬁnite.
T h eo n l yp r e v i o u sm o d e l sw i t haﬁnite number of states are Green (1982), Huber
and Gordon (2007) and Amador et al (2006). Green shows that the optimal stochastic
delegation set is the solution to a linear programming problem if (contrary to our model)
there is a ﬁnite number of feasible decisions. Huber and Gordon characterize the ODS
for an example with three feasible decisions. Amador et al show that the principal might
achieve ﬁrst best in a two-state model if preferences are suﬃciently aligned and any scalar
decision is feasible (as in our model); that the ODS features separation with intermediate
alignment; and that delegation is otherwise not valuable. We generalize these properties
to any ﬁnite number of states.
Other notable, but less related contributions include Ambrus and Egorov (2009), Arm-
strong and Vickers (2010), Krishna and Morgan (2008) and Mylovanov (2008).
Our discussion of the principal’s choice of an agent is closely related to Ivanov (2010),
who constructs an amateur who outperforms the expert in Holmstrom’s model whenever
delegation is valuable.7 We allow for a richer set of possible amateurs, which we exploit
7The Expertise Principle also fails in Postlewaite’s (1982) Case II; but preferences therein fail the single
crossing property, and there is a ﬁnite number of feasible decisions.
5when characterizing the best agent. Our demonstration that the principal may prefer to
appoint an amateur is reminiscent of a result in the signalling literature: the principal
may prefer to take advice from an amateur: cf. Fischer and Stocken (2001) and Ivanov
(2010).
The agent’s choice of expertise is related to the problem studied by Szalay (2005) inter
alia, where the agent can observe the state exactly at some private cost of eﬀort. By
contrast, we suppose that acquiring expertise is costless, and that the principal oﬀers a
delegation set after observing the agent’s expertise.
In Section 2, we deﬁne the basic model used to describe optimal delegation problem. In
Section 3 we analyze that problem and derive the ODS. We discuss the general properties
of the ODS in Sections 4 and 5. The application to expertise is presented Section 6. We
summarize and discuss how our results might generalize in Section 7, and provide lengthier
proofs in the Appendix and an online Appendix (Anesi and Seidmann (2011)).
2T h e m o d e l
Players and preferences
There are two players in the model: a principal (he) and an agent (she). The preferences
of both players depend on a decision variable, d, and on a random state of the world, t,
in which the decision is taken.8. We assume that there is only a ﬁnite set of conceivable
states, which we denote T ≡ {0,1,...,T − 1}, but that d can take any real value. The








A principal who knew the state t for sure would therefore take decision d = t/(T − 1).
Accordingly, we refer to t/(T −1) as the principal’s ideal decision in state t.W en o r m a l i z e
by dividing the state by T − 1 in order to facilitate comparison with Holmstrom’s (1984)
continuous-state model.
The agent’s evaluation of decision d is given by loss function
Λ(d,t) ≡
µ




for some b>0. For any value of b, the agent’s ideal decision in state t is thus b+t/(T −1),
which exceeds the principal’s ideal decision in state t by b. We refer to b as the agent’s
bias. By construction, the bias is state-independent.
An obvious, but important, implication of these loss functions is that the principal
strictly prefers the agent to take decision d over decision e in those states where the agent
weakly prefers d over e. This property will play a decisive role in the analysis below.
8There are no money transfers, as in Holmstrom (1984). We discuss the implications at the end of
Section 3.2
6Information and timing
Events unfold as follows: 1) Nature chooses a state t in T and — unless otherwise stated
—r e v e a l st h et r u ev a l u eo ft privately to the agent; 2) The principal oﬀers the agent a
delegation set (to be deﬁned shortly); 3) The agent takes a decision d in the delegation
set.
The agent is asymmetrically informed about the state relative to the principal, who
only knows that every possible state is equally likely. Both players’ loss functions are
common knowledge.
Delegation sets
Broadly deﬁned, a delegation set is any collection of decisions: that is, any nonempty
subset of R. A delegation set (say, ∆) could include decisions which the agent would never
take. We follow the literature by focusing on minimal delegation sets: that is, delegation
sets with the property that a loss-minimizing agent with bias b would take each decision
in ∆ in some state. This is the right focus because an optimal delegation set minimizes
the principal’s expected loss over all incentive compatible mechanisms (cf. Melumad and
Shibano (1991)); so exactly the decisions in a minimal delegation set are taken according to
every optimal mechanism. Accordingly, we deﬁne D(b) as the class of minimal delegation
sets when the agent’s bias is b. We will henceforth drop the qualiﬁer ‘minimal’.
A brief inspection of λA reveals that an agent who is oﬀered ∆ ∈ D(b) can only be
indiﬀerent between two distinct decisions in any state; so a delegation set must contain
a ﬁnite number of decisions. We will suppose that the agent takes the lowest decision in
∆ which minimizes her loss in each state.9 Formally, for every state t ∈ T,d e ﬁne the
decision function dt : D(b) × R+ → R as









: d ∈ ∆
))
.
Note that we implicitly assume here that the agent never mixes over decisions. This is
without loss of generality because it is never optimal for the principal to induce the agent
to randomize.










: Φ ∈ D(b)
)
.
The class of optimal delegation sets when the agent’s bias is b is denoted by D∗
T(b).A
generic element of D∗
T(b) is of the form {δ0,...,δK}, where we order decisions such that
i<jimplies δi <δ j. In the next section, we characterize the class of ODSs for every bias.
Some more terminology will prove useful. A principal who oﬀers a single-decision ODS
must oﬀer the decision which he would take if he did not delegate. Accordingly, we will
say that delegation is valuable if and only if every ODS contains more than one decision.
9Single crossing implies that this supposition is without loss of generality.
7It will also be useful to benchmark our results against an alternative model in which
the principal places no restrictions on the agent (as in Dessein (2002)), implicitly oﬀering





for t ∈ T.W e w i l l s a y t h a t s u c h a
principal fully delegates.
3 Derivation of the optimal delegation set
3.1 Top loading and the chain property
It is important for both theoretical and practical purposes that ODSs have a simple struc-
ture. It turns out that every ODS satisﬁes two simple conditions. We need some more
notation to specify these conditions. For every ∆ = {δ0,...,δK} ∈ D(b),d e ﬁne tk(∆,b)
and Tk(∆,b) as follows:
Tk(∆,b) ≡ {τ ∈ T : dτ (∆,b)=δk} ,
tk(∆,b) ≡ max{τ : τ ∈ Tk(∆,b)} .
The elements of Tk(∆,b) are the states in which the agent takes decision δk from ∆,a n d
tk(∆,b) is the maximal such state.
Deﬁnition 1. A delegation set ∆ = {δ0,...,δK} ∈ D(b) satisﬁe st o pl o a d i n gi fa n do n l y
if |Tk(∆,b)| > 1 implies that k = K.
Deﬁnition 2. A delegation set ∆ ∈ D(b) satisﬁes the chain property if and only if τ1 =
tk(∆,b) and τ2 = tk+1(∆,b) imply that
Λ(dτ1(∆,b),τ1)=Λ(dτ2(∆,b),τ1)
for every k =0 ,...,K− 1.
In words: ∆ is top loaded when only the largest decision in ∆ i st a k e ni nm o r et h a no n e
state; and ∆ satisﬁes the chain property if an agent who takes diﬀerent decisions in states
t and t+1is indiﬀerent between them in state t.I f∆ satisﬁes the chain property then it
must exclude any decisions between those taken in states t and t+1because convexity of
the agent’s loss function implies that she would prefer this compromise in state t.10 Our
example of jury instructions in the Introduction illustrates a delegation set which excludes
compromises.
Theorem 1 below asserts that every ODS satisﬁes the chain property and top loading.
The ODS in Holmstrom’s interval support model is top loaded, but does not satisfy the
chain property.11 Cheap talk models with interval support satisfy an analog of the chain
property: the support is partitioned into a ﬁnite number of intervals in every equilibrium;
and, at the maximal state in all but the largest element of the partition, the agent is
10This argument implies that a non-minimal delegation set which satisﬁed the chain property would also
have to exclude compromises.
11The ODS fails top loading in Koessler and Martimort (2009).
8indiﬀerent between the decision it induces and the next highest decision taken by the
principal.12 However, these equilibria do not satisfy top loading.
An important implication of Deﬁnitions 1 and 2 is that any delegation set ∆ which
is top loaded and satisﬁes the chain property, is deﬁned by two parameters: the lowest
decision in ∆ (namely, δ0) and the number of decisions it contains (namely, K +1 ).
Theorem 1 establishes that the number of decisions in an ODS for an agent with bias b is












2(T−1) if K>0 ,
+∞ otherwise.
This result immediately implies that: (i) there is a unique ODS if b 6= k
2(T−1) for any
k ∈ {1,...,T−1}, and only two ODSs otherwise; and (ii) delegation is not valuable if and
only if b>b min(0,T)= T
2(T−1).
Having determined K, the lowest decision in the ODS is then chosen to minimize the
principal’s expected loss, subject to the agent being indiﬀerent between δt and δt+1 in
every state t ∈ {0,...,K− 1}, and taking the maximal decision in every higher state.
3.2 The ODS
We are now in a position to fully characterize the ODS:
Theorem 1. If b ≤ 1
2(T−1) then the ODS consists of the T decisions which are ideal for









(i) Every ODS satisﬁes the chain property and top loading;
(ii) If b 6= k
2(T−1) for any k ∈ {2,...,T − 1} then there is a unique ODS, ∆∗ ≡
{δ∗
0,...,δ∗










T b − 1
2(T−1) +
(T−K)2
2T(T−1) if K is even,
2T−K−1
T b − T−1
2T(T−1) −
(T−K)2
2T(T−1) if K is odd.
In particular, if b> T





(iii) If b = k
2(T−1) for some k ∈ {2,...,T− 1} then there are two ODSs: the ODS with
T − k and with T − k +1decisions deﬁned in part (ii) above.
12This analog of the chain property does not hold in cheap talk games with a ﬁnite support.
13We introduce slightly more general notation for use in the next subsection.




T−1 if i is even,
2b −  (b,T,K)+ i−1
T−1 if i is odd,
where
and  (b,T,K) ≡
½
 e(b,T,K) if K is even,






















We prove Theorem 1 in Appendix A. We will explain how we prove the result in the
next subsection. Appendix C illustrates the ODS for the special cases of three, four and
ﬁve states.
The principal’s problem could be solved by ﬁnding the loss-minimizing delegation set
with K decisions, and then minimizing again over K. While Theorem 1 asserts that every
ODS satisﬁes top loading, this is not true of the best delegation sets containing a ﬁxed
number of decisions. For example, if there are four states and 1
6 <b<1
3 then the best
two-decision delegation set is {b,b + 2
3}, which fails top loading because the agent takes




Our assumption that money transfers are unavailable does not seem to qualitatively
aﬀect our results: we can show that the ODS satisﬁes the chain property and top loading
when there are three states and a delegation set consists of money-decision pairs.14
3.3 Proof strategy
The technical problem in determining the ODS in models with interval support is how to
convert it into a ﬁnite-dimensional problem. On the other hand, Melumad and Shibano
(1991) Lemma 1 demonstrates that incentive constraints are very restrictive in models
with interval support: the agent takes her ideal decision if the decisions taken are locally
continuous and strictly monotonic in the state. Alonso and Matouschek (2008) use this
property to provide conditions for the principal to reduce his loss by adding or removing
decisions from a given delegation set. In particular, adding an intermediate decision to any
ﬁnite delegation set induces the agent to take a less extreme decision in some intermediate
states. Alonso and Matouschek use such local patches (adding or removing intermediate
decisions) to characterize the ODS.
Models with ﬁnite support are automatically ﬁnite-dimensional. However, the incentive
constraints are no longer as strong because the agent’s ideal decisions are 1/(T−1) apart; so
14Details are available from the authors on request.
10the eﬀect of adding or removing intermediate decisions depends on the original delegation
set. In particular, adding a decision to those taken in states t and t +1can induce the
agent to take this compromise decision in states s ≤ t (if the delegation set satisﬁes the
chain property) or in states s ≥ t +1(if the agent strictly prefers her decision in state t)
or in no states. In sum, we cannot use Alonso and Matouschek’s local patches; so we use
entirely diﬀerent arguments to characterize the ODS.
One might conjecture that Theorem 1 could be proved by induction on the number
of states, but this turns out not to be fruitful. Furthermore, as we noted above, the best
K-decision delegation sets do not necessarily satisfy the chain property or top loading; so
induction on K is uninstructive.
Instead, we exploit the recursive structure of the ODS. Consider the event E ≡ {τ ≥ t}
for some state t>0. In light of single-crossing, the ODS induces the agent to take decisions
which minimize the principal’s loss on E subject to the agent preferring dτ over dτ+1 for
every state in E ∪ {t − 1}. We exploit this property by deﬁning and characterizing ODSs
on connected subsets of states, and use induction arguments on the size of these events.
We will further exploit our characterization when we describe the ODS for amateur agents
in Section 5.
We need some additional notation for this purpose. Let Ts,t ≡ {t,t+1,...,t+s−1} ⊆
T, and deﬁne the probability distribution ps,t as
ps,t ({τ}) ≡
½
1/s if τ ∈ Ts,t
0 otherwise,
for every τ ∈ T,w h e r eTT,0 = T. Thus, assuming that the state is distributed according
to ps,t amounts to assuming that only the states in Ts,t can occur, each with the same
probability.
We now generalize the deﬁnitions of Section 2, using this interpretation. Let Ds,t(b)
be the class of delegation sets when the agent’s bias is b and the state is in Ts,t,a n ds a y


















The class of ODSs for Ts,t when the agent’s bias is b is denoted by D∗
s,t(b).
We are now in a position to provide an outline of the construction on which the proof
of Theorem 1 is based. The following existence result proves necessary as a ﬁrst step to
doing so because we will use negative arguments to characterize ODSs.
Lemma 1. D∗
s,t(b) 6= ∅ for every t ∈ T, every integer s ≤ T − t,a n da n yb ≥ 0.
Lemma 1 establishes existence. The characterization argument is rather long, and
involves three intermediate steps. These steps, however, are of some interest in their own
right, as they expose interesting relationships between the various properties of ODSs.





















and  (b,s,K) ≡
½
 e(b,s,K) if K is even,
 o(b,s,K) if K is odd.
(4)
Lemma 2. Let b> 1
2(T−1).I f ∆ ≡ {δt,...,δt+K} is in D∗
s,t(b) and satisﬁes the chain




T−1 if τ is even,
2b −  (b,s,K)+t+τ−1
T−1 if τ is odd,





Note that substituting s = T into Lemma 2 yields the ODS identiﬁed in Theorem 1.
The next step proceeds by induction on the number of states. We start from the following
hypothesis:
(Hs) For every z ≤ s and every t ≤ T − z,e v e r y∆ ∈ D∗
z,t(b) satisﬁes the chain property
and top loading.
(Hs) says that ODSs satisfy the chain property and top loading when the number of
possible states does not exceed s. It is easy to conﬁrm that, for every t ∈ T\{T − 1},a n
ODS for T2,t satisﬁes the chain property and top loading: that is, (H2) is true.
(Hs) implies that every ODS for s +1states has also the chain property:
Lemma 3. If (Hs) then, for every t ≤ T − s − 1, ∆ ∈ D∗
s+1,t(b) implies that ∆ satisﬁes
the chain property.
The last step asserts that the chain property and optimality jointly imply top loading.
Formally:
Lemma 4. If ∆ ∈ D∗
s,t(b) satisﬁes the chain property then ∆ is top loaded.
Lemmas 2, 3, and 4 jointly allow us to provide the full characterization of ODSs in
Theorem 1.
4 Analysis of the ODS
Properties of the ODS in ﬁnite environments
We can now use Theorem 1 to study how a limited number of states aﬀects the structure
of optimal delegation sets. A useful benchmark against which to measure the impact of
ﬁnite states is the continuous state model. Let D∗
∞(b) be the class of ODSs when the
12agent’s bias is b and the state is uniformly distributed on [0,1] (viz. Holmstrom’s model).
Melumad and Shibano (1991) prove that D∗




[b,1 − b] if b ∈ [0,1/2] ,
{1/2} if b>1/2 .
(5)
The next result demonstrates that ﬁniteness generates interesting features of optimal
delegation that Holmstrom’s model does not capture:
Corollary 1. If ∆ is an ODS, then the following statements are true:
(i) dt(∆,b) > t
T−1 for every t ≤ |∆| − 1 if and only if b> 1
2(T−1);
(ii) dt(∆,b) <b+ t
T−1 for every t ∈ T;
( i i i )D e l e g a t i o ni sv a l u a b l ei fa n do n l yi fb< T
2(T−1);
(iv) At critical levels of the bias, b = k
2(T−1), the two ODSs induce the agent to take
the same decision in each state t ≤ T − k − 1;
(v) The agent takes a decision below b if and only if delegation is valuable and the state
is 0;
(vi) The agent takes a decision above 1 if and only if 1
2(T−1) <b< 1
T−1 and the state
is T − 1.
Part (i) asserts that the agent takes decisions which exceed the principal’s ideal in all
states where the chain property holds. If b ≤ 1/2(T −1) then the chain property does not
apply because the ODS is ﬁrst best for the principal. For larger biases, the ODS induces
the agent to take a decision above the principal’s ideal in states t ≤ K.H o w e v e r ,p a r t( v i )
implies that this property does not generalize to all states: the agent takes a decision less
than 1 in state T − 1 whenever b>1/(T − 1).
We prove Corollary 1 in Appendix B. Three notable properties of ODSs emerge from
our analysis:
(a) Compromise: Parts (i) and (ii) imply that the agent takes a decision strictly
between her and the principal’s ideal whenever t ≤ K and the ODS is not ﬁrst best. In
contrast to full delegation problems (cf. Dessein (2002)), the agent takes a decision strictly
below her ideal in every state.
(b) Exclusion of intermediate decisions: Part (ii) also implies that intermediate
decisions must be excluded from the ODS, even if we drop minimality: for every decision
δ in the ODS ∆,t h e r ei san e i g h b o r h o o do fδ, N(δ), such that adding any element of N(δ)
to ∆ would increase the principal’s loss.
(c) Extreme decisions: In full delegation problems, the agent necessarily takes her
ideal decision in every state, irrespective of the cardinality of the support; so the minimal
and maximal decisions are respectively b and 1+b. In particular the agent takes decisions
which exceed 1 (the maximal ideal decision for the principal) in every state t>1 − b.
Part (v) asserts that the agent only takes a decision below b when the ODS is non-
singleton. Theorem 1 then implies that the agent is indiﬀerent in state 0 between the
13lowest two decisions in the ODS, which implies that she must take decisions above b in
every positive state.
If the ODS contains T decisions but is not ﬁrst best then parts (i) and (ii) imply that
the agent takes a decision exceeding 1 in state T − 1, just as in full delegation problems.
However, in contrast to such problems, part (vi) asserts that the agent only takes a decision
exceeding 1 in these circumstances. The intuition is that the agent is indiﬀerent in state
T − 2 between the two highest decisions in an ODS which contains T decisions. This
is only possible when the second highest decision is less than 1 because b<1/(T − 1).
Part (iv) implies that the ODS drops the highest decision when the bias increases above
1/(T − 1), which implies part (vi).
Comparison with the interval support model
A brief inspection of ∆∗
∞(b) reveals that none of these properties hold in the continuous-
state version of the model. The agent never takes a decision below her lowest ideal decision
(i.e., b) or above the principal’s highest ideal decision (i.e., 1). Furthermore, if b<1/2
then the agent takes her ideal decision in every state below 1−2b:t h eO D Si sa ni n t e r v a l ,
so the principal does not exclude intermediate decisions.
Note that properties (a)-(c) can also be obtained by relaxing assumptions other than
continuous states. For instance, the agent never takes her ideal decision in Koessler and
Martimort (2009) because decisions are multi-dimensional. Considering more general pay-
oﬀ functions and state distributions, Alonso and Matouschek (2008) derive necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for the ODS to include decisions inside the agent’s range of ideal de-
cisions. They also show that the ODS contains at most one decision below (resp. above)
the agent’s (resp principal’s) range of ideal policies. As the comparison between D∗
T(b)
(T<∞)a n dD∗
∞(b) makes apparent, however, having a small number of states suﬃces to
generate (a)-(c).
If T is suﬃciently large then the support of states is close to [0,1], and the probability
distribution is almost uniform. Although our focus is on the small-T c a s e ,i ti so fi n t e r e s t
to note that the ODS in our model approaches the ODS in the continuous-state model as
T becomes arbitrarily large:
Observation 1. For all b ≥ 0, limT→∞ D∗
T(b)=D∗
∞(b).
We prove Observation 1 in Appendix B.
5 Variations in bias
We now conduct a series of comparative statics exercises on the ODSs derived in Section
3. Speciﬁcally, we investigate how changes in bias aﬀect the distribution of decisions taken
by the agent and, thereby, the principal’s expected loss.
14Optimal delegation and the agent’s discretion
We ﬁrst investigate how the ODS changes with the bias. For expositional convenience,
deﬁne








as the mapping that assigns the unique ODS to every non-critical value of the bias. Fur-
thermore, describe any b = k
2(T−1) for some k ∈ {1,...,T} as ‘critical’. Comparative static
analysis of ∆(b) yields:
Proposition 1. Suppose that the initial bias is low enough that delegation is valuable.
(i) Consider a marginal increase in bias from b0 to b1.I f b0 is not critical then the
principal raises all decisions in the ODS. By contrast, if b0 is critical then the principal
drops the highest decision in the ODS: viz. limb&b0 ∆(b) ⊂ limb%b0 ∆(b).
(ii) Consider an increase in bias from b0 to b1 which is large enough that ∆(b1) contains
fewer decisions than ∆(b0).T h e n ,
d0 (∆(b0),b 0) <d 0 (∆(b1),b 1) ,a n ddT−1 (∆(b1),b 1) <d T−1 (∆(b0),b 0)
(so ∆(b0) has a larger diameter than ∆(b1)).
Proposition 1(i) implies that a small enough increase in b from a non-critical starting
point shifts the ODS to the right, just as in models of full delegation (Dessein (2002)).
In our model, the two players compromise on the decision taken in each state. A small
increase in bias then raises each compromise decision.
Relatedly, Proposition 1 implies that ∆(b0) and ∆(b1) are only ordered by set-inclusion
at critical values of the bias. This observation bears on a standard prediction in the
literature on legislative control agencies, the Ally Principle, which asserts that the principal
gives more discretion to a less biased agent. The literature deﬁnes discretion in terms of
set inclusion: the principal gives less discretion to agent 0 than to agent 1 if he oﬀers ∆i
to agent i and ∆0 ⊂ ∆1. Although set-inclusion is only a partial ordering of delegation
sets, a brief inspection of (5) reveals that the Ally Principle holds in Holmstrom’s (1984)
continuous-state model.
Proposition 1 implies that this conclusion does not carry over to the ﬁnite state model
when the bias is not critical.15 This is not surprising, as set inclusion seems to be quite
a demanding criterion in a ﬁnite-state environment. It is therefore striking that the Ally
Principle holds in our model for marginal variations in bias at critical levels.
Discretion can alternatively be measured by the variance of the decision taken by the
agent. The Ally Principle would then assert that the variance of the ODS is greater, the
less biased is the agent. This version of the Ally Principle is evidently less demanding in
a ﬁnite-state world.
15The previous literature (e.g., Huber and McCarty (2004) and Alonso and Matouschek (2008)) has
already shown that relaxing some of Holmstrom’s assumptions, other than interval support, may cause the
Ally Principle to fail.















We can use our characterization of the ODS to prove that






when T is odd
(resp. even).16
Observation 2 implies that this version of the Ally Principle fails for an interval of bias.
Observation 2 may also hold for larger bias: the variance of decisions is strictly increasing
in b when K =2and when K = T − 3 (but is decreasing when K = T − 2).
Observation 2 is a direct implication of ﬁniteness: it is readily checked that the variance
of the decision in Holmstrom’s continuous-state model is strictly decreasing in b whenever
delegation is valuable.17
Observation 2 describes the local behavior of the variance at non-critical bias. The
variance of decisions decreases when b crosses a critical threshold.
The value of delegation
We now turn to another version of the Ally Principle in the literature: that the principal
prefers to appoint an agent with a lower bias. The literature suggests various reasons why
this might fail: for example, the principal may optimally appoint a more biased agent if
her decision is itself a move in a larger game, as in Vickers (1985), where other players best-
respond to the agent; or to motivate an agent to become better informed, as in Callander
(2008). We now use Corollary 1 to show that this version of the Ally Principle holds in
our model:
Proposition 2. The principal strictly prefers to appoint a less biased agent.
Proof: Let ∆1 = {δ0,...,δK} ∈ D∗
T(b1). Theorem 1 implies that an agent with bias
b1 is indiﬀerent between δt and δt+1 in states t<K . An agent with bias b0 <b 1 must
strictly prefer δt over δt+1 in states t<K ; so the principal loses no more by oﬀering ∆1
to agent b0 than he loses when oﬀering (the optimal) ∆1 to agent b1.
Corollary 1 implies that δ0 = d0 (∆1,b) > 0. The principal can then improve upon ∆1
when transacting with the agent b0 by reducing δ0 towards 0.
¤
Put diﬀerently, the value of delegation – i.e. the diﬀerence between the principal’s
(minimal) expected loss when he takes the decision himself and his expected loss when he
delegates – decreases with the agent’s bias.
16See Anesi and Seidmann (2011) for the requisite calculations.
17In further contrast, the expected decision is an inverted U-shaped function of bias in Holmstrom (1984);
whereas a local increase in bias generically raises the entire ODS here (cf. Proposition 1).
166 Application: Expertise
Thus far, we have studied the constraints that the presence of preference divergence and
asymmetric information between the principal and agent puts on the ODS. Our analysis up
to this point has assumed that the agent is an expert in the sense that she perfect observes
the realization of the state. In many real-world situations, however, principals seem not
to appoint expert agents. According to many commentators, political appointments to
bureaucracies have become increasingly prevalent in the US and the UK. Hurricane Katrina
focused concerns that these bureaucrats are appointed for their loyalty, even though they
are (on average) less competent than career civil servants.18 A recent literature has built
on these features by studying the ensuing trade-oﬀ between loyalty and expertise: cf.
Egorov and Sonin (forthcoming), Gailmard and Patty (2007) and Huber and McCarty
(2004).
In this section, we use our results from the previous sections to investigate whether the
principal appoints the most expert agent when given the choice among a pool of agents
with diﬀerent levels of knowledge about the state but the same bias, and whether an agent
would choose ex ante to become fully informed before she is oﬀered a delegation set.
Like Ivanov (2010), we treat knowledge as partitional. Speciﬁcally, we suppose that
each agent has a partition, {P1,...,P n},o ft h eT states into n ≤ T events. The agent
in previous sections has n = T; we refer to such an agent as the expert. In contrast to
Ivanov, we do not require that the events are connected, in the sense that an agent may
be unable to distinguish between states t−1 and t+1, but can distinguish state t.( S t a t e s
are ordered by their payoﬀ implications.)19
We will apply our techniques and characterization results from the previous sections
to study the payoﬀ consequences of the agent having a coarser partition of the set of states
(i.e. n<T ). We explore the conditions on bias under which the principal and/or the
agent can gain if the principal appoints an amateur rather than an expert. At ﬁrst sight,
it seems implausible that an amateur could outperform the expert because an amateur
who cannot distinguish between states in some event must take the same decision in that
event. The decision taken by an expert must therefore be at least as state-dependent as
that taken by an amateur. As we will demonstrate, however, this does not imply that the
principal is better oﬀ appointing an expert.
6.1 Preliminary intuitions
It is expositionally useful to postpone the statement of our general results and begin with
an intuitive presentation of the key mechanisms at work. Speciﬁcally, there are two reasons
why the principal may be better oﬀ appointing an amateur rather than the expert.
The ﬁrst reason is that an agent’s expertise may force the principal to oﬀer her too
18Lewis (2007) and Kelman and Myers (2009) provide evidence which supports this conjecture, even
though civil servants may be unduly biased towards the status quo (cf. McCarty (2004)).
19By contrast, Bendor and Meirowitz (2004) and Egorov and Sonin (forthcoming) model an amateur
as an agent who knows the state with some probability and otherwise has the same prior beliefs as the
principal.
17many decisions. To see this, it is useful to focus on putative improvements which replace
a subset of decisions in the expert’s ODS. Speciﬁcally, suppose that there are four states,
















and the principal loses 5
4b2 − 1
2b+ 1





3}:w h e r e3
2b − 1
3 replaces the lower two decisions in ∆.I ft h ea g e n t
were always to take 3
2b − 1
3 in E then the principal would lose 9
4b2 − 3
2b + 5
18 in E,w h i c h
is less than 5
4b2 − 1
2b+ 1
18. In other words, the principal would lose less when he oﬀers ∆0,
provided that the agent takes 3
2b− 1
3 in E. The latter condition fails when the agent is an
expert because she would take 1
2b + 2
3 in state 1.
Now consider an amateur who cannot distinguish between the states in E, but knows
the exact state otherwise. The ﬁrst decision in ∆0 has been calibrated such that the
amateur is indiﬀerent across ∆0 when the state is in E, and strictly prefers 1
2b+ 2
3 in states
2 and 3 (by the single-crossing property). Consequently, this amateur would always take
3
2b − 1
3 in E, and would take 1
2b + 2
3 in states 2 and 3. In sum, the principal is better oﬀ
appointing this amateur and oﬀering her ∆0 than appointing the expert and oﬀering her
ODS.
Notice that we have constructed ∆0 such that the principal only gains in those states
that the amateur cannot distinguish. Most of our arguments below will rely on this
property; but it is important to understand that the principal might also gain in states
outside E: the second reason why an amateur might outperform the expert. To see
this, note that the decisions taken in states 2 and 3 are also too high. The principal
could therefore improve on ∆0 by oﬀering another pair of decisions which satisfy the chain
property (the agent is indiﬀerent between them in event E). Calculations in Appendix
C.2 reveal that the ODS for this amateur is {b − 1
6,b+ 1
2}: the principal improves on ∆0
by raising the ﬁrst and reducing the second decision in ∆0. This reinforces our observation
that the principal prefers to appoint an amateur than the expert. Indeed, it turns out
that the principal cannot improve on appointing this amateur.
By construction, agents share the same bias, and therefore make the same loss after
any history, irrespective of whether they have been appointed to take the decisions. It is
easy to conﬁrm that the agents prefer the principal to oﬀer the expert her ODS than to
oﬀer ∆0 to an amateur, but that they are better oﬀ if the principal appoints the amateur
than the expert if he would oﬀer each agent her ODS. However, agents would be best oﬀ
if the principal appointed an agent who cannot distinguish between states 1 and 2.
6.2 Agent performance
We now turn to the more general setting of T states, again supposing that the principal
can appoint the expert or an agent who cannot distinguish between states in some speciﬁed
events E (i.e., an amateur) .W ew i l ls a yt h a ts o m ea m a t e u routperforms the expert if the
principal loses more by appointing the expert than appointing some amateur if he oﬀers
each agent her loss-minimizing delegation set (ODS). Our main result in this subsection
18states that (i) the expert cannot be outperformed by any amateur when b is high enough
that delegation is not valuable or when b is low enough that the principal can achieve ﬁrst
best with the expert; but (ii) for intermediate bias, there is an amateur who outperforms
the expert.








We prove Proposition 3 in Appendix B.
Proposition 3 generalizes our arguments in the last subsection. In particular, it asserts
that some amateur outperforms the expert for intermediate bias. Our construction of
a superior amateur generalizes that used in the last subsection when K>1:s u c h a n
amateur cannot distinguish between states K − 2 and K − 1; and we again construct a
delegation set such that the amateur and the expert take the same decisions in all states
other than K − 2 and K − 1. Our construction diﬀers when b ∈ (1
2, T
2(T−1)), when the
expert would take two decisions: the superior amateur can now not distinguish between
states 0 and 1. In that event, she takes a decision below that taken on average by the
expert, and takes a higher decision than the expert in states t>1. As above, we prove
the result by showing that the principal loses less by oﬀering some delegation set to some
amateur, rather than by characterizing a given amateur’s ODS.
The premise of part (ii) excludes b ∈ ( 1
2(T−1), 1
T−1): when the ODS contains T decisions.
It is easy to conﬁrm that the expert outperforms an amateur who cannot distinguish
between states T − 3 and T − 2, and takes the same decisions as the expert in all other
states.20 This observation and part (ii) imply that no amateur outperforms the expert if
there are fewer than four states. This is obvious when T =2 , and slightly more subtle
when T =3 . Arguments used in the proof of part (ii) then imply that no amateur can
outperform the expert if b>1/(T−1); the observation implies that an amateur who cannot
distinguish between states 0 and 1 cannot outperform the expert; and an argument at the
end of the last subsection precludes an amateur who cannot distinguish between states 1
and 2 outperforming the expert.21
As T increases, the interval ( 1
2(T−1), 1
T−1) shrinks; so, for arbitrarily large T,a na m -
ateur outperforms the expert whenever delegation is valuable. This is consistent with
Ivanov (2010) Theorem 4, which asserts that some amateur outperforms the expert in
Holmstrom’s model whenever delegation is valuable. Ivanov attributes this result to the
fact that an expert then takes her ideal decision in some states (p736). Proposition 3
shows that some amateur outperforms the expert even if the principal compromises with
the expert: a feature of the ODS.
Proposition 3 emphasizes the signiﬁcance of our approach to modelling ‘amateurs’. We
have supposed that an amateur cannot distinguish between some states, whereas Bendor
20We provide a proof of this claim, which we dub Observation 3, in the online Appendix (Anesi and
Seidmann (2011)).
21Delegation to an amateur who cannot distinguish between states 0 and 2 is never valuable because her
preferences over decisions are state-independent.
19and Meirowitz (2004) model an amateur as an agent who shares the principal’s beliefs with
positive probability, and otherwise observes the state exactly. Bendor and Meirowitz note
that the principal would never appoint an amateur of their sort unless she is less biased
than the expert. By contrast, Proposition 3 explains evidence of incompetent political
appointees without reference to a tradeoﬀ betweeen loyalty and expertise. Indeed, it
implies that the principal could optimally appoint an agent who is less loyal than an
expert.
6.3 Preferences over expertise
Thus far, we have focused on the principal’s point of view, as in Ivanov (2010). In contrast
to the previous literature, we now consider the agent’s preferences over her expertise.
Speciﬁcally, we imagine that the agent can costlessly choose a possibly empty set of events
such that she cannot distinguish between states in each event. The principal observes the
agent’s expertise and then oﬀers her the delegation set which minimizes the principal’s
loss (viz. the ODS).22
To be concrete, consider the relationship between a defendant (principal) and his
attorney (agent). The attorney discovers the state via conversations with the defendant,
who instructs the attorney on how to conduct the case (the delegation set). The attorney
shares the defendant’s interests, but is required (by ABA ethics rules) to disclose his
intended perjury to the court:23 an eﬀect analogous to a bias. Accordingly, the attorney
would not ask questions whose answers might require disclosure: an instance of willful
ignorance. In our terms, the attorney commits not to observe the exact state.
We will argue that the agent in our model would choose not to become the expert for
some bias levels. The driving force for this result turns on the degree to which the two
players share preferences over decision-state pairs. In particular, we do not assume that
greater expertise is more costly. In other words, there is no trade-oﬀ between cost and
expertise in our model.
It is obvious that the agent would choose to be the expert when b is low enough: for
the expert’s ODS then induces the agent to take decisions which are almost ideal for her in
every state; whereas the decision which she takes would not depend on the state in some
event(s) if she chose to be an amateur. In sum, the agent shares the principal’s preference
for an expert when b is low enough (cf. Proposition 3).
It is also obvious that the principal and the agent are indiﬀerent across expertise when
b is so high that delegation is not valuable. More interestingly, our next result shows
that the principal and the agent both prefer that the agent be some amateur rather than
the expert when b ∈ (1
2, T
2(T−1)): that is, the expert’s ODS consists of two decisions (cf.
Theorem 1):
Proposition 4. If b ∈ (1
2, T
2(T−1)) then the principal and the agent are both better oﬀ when
the agent cannot distinguish between states 0 and 1 than when she is the expert.
22An equivalent interpretation is that agents with diverse expertise choose whether to become candidates
for appointment.
23See ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3(b).
20We prove Proposition 4 in Appendix B. The proof demonstrates that the ODS for this
amateur ({δ01
0 ,δ01
1 }) consists of two decisions for this range of biases, and that the agent
takes the lower decision in states 0 and 1 alone. We can then calculate the principal’s and
the agent’s losses, yielding the result.
The intuition for the agent’s preferences can best be seen for b close to T/2(T − 1)



















It is easy to conﬁrm that the expert loses less than the amateur in state 1. However, δ01
1 is
less than the agent’s ideal decision in states t, so the expert’s gain in state 1 is over-ridden
by the extra losses in higher states.
Proposition 4 is consistent with anecdotal evidence that defendants and attorneys both
prefer that the attorney not ask questions which are too detailed.
Proposition 4 can also be read from a normative standpoint. A regulator concerned
with the players’ welfare who could only choose an information structure would not ne-
cessarily require that the agent be an expert.
Proposition 4 and the preceding discussion imply that the agent prefers to be the
amateur for some, but not all bias levels. This result parallels Luban’s (1999) argument
that the ethics of the attorney’s willful ignorance turn on her motives.
The principal’s and the agent’s preferences over expertise are more complicated when
b is intermediate. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, the identiﬁcation of the best ama-
teur, from either player’s point of view, remains an unsolved problem in the Holmstrom’s
continuous-state model: probably because of the technical diﬃculties one would have to
overcome. Identifying the principal’s best amateur is also a challenging problem in our
model because the ODS for a given amateur need not satisfy either the chain property or
top-loading. Nevertheless, we can make some progress by exploiting our previous results;
in particular:
• The ODS for amateur E (ODSE) shares the recursive structure of the ODS for an
expert. Thus, ODSE minimizes the expected loss for states outside E subject to
incentive constraints for states in T\E and for states just below E. The constraints
in T\E are also faced by the expert; so we can use Lemma 2 to characterize the
decisions taken for states in T\E.
• Proposition 3 establishes a benchmark when K<T−1: the best amateur must out-
perform the expert. This immediately implies that amateur who cannot disitnguish
between states in E ≡ {t,...,T −1} cannot be best, as the principal can oﬀer ODSE
to the expert.
Combined with these observations, the ﬁniteness of the set of states allows us to calcu-
late the principal’s and the agent’s ideal expertise for cases with less than six states. (We
will treat ideal expertise and best amateur as synonyms below.) We will simplify notation
24See the proof of Proposition 4 for the amateur’s ODS, and Section 3.2 for the expert’s ODS.
21by denoting an agent who cannot distinguish states s and t as agent st, an agent who
cannot distinguish between s and t or between u and v as st,uv,e t c .
It is easy to see that cases with two or three states are uninteresting: delegation is not
valuable for the only amateur in the former case; while amateurs 01 and 12 are payoﬀ-
equivalent (and no better than the expert) when there are three states. We calculate the
ODS for the expert and for amateurs when there are four or ﬁve states in Appendices C.2
and C.3.25 We summarize the expertise that the principal and the agent would choose for
every bias
Table 1 describes the principal’s and the agent’s ideal expertise when T =4 .T h e
expert’s ODS comprises four decisions (K =3 )w h e nb<1/3, three decisions (K =2 )
when b ∈ (1/3,1/2), and two decisions (K =1 )w h e nb ∈ (1/2,2/3).

















Table 1: T =4
If b>5/8 then delegation to an expert is not valuable, so it is not valuable to any
other agent, all of whom are therefore (trivially) best for both players.
If 3/8 <b<2/3 then the principal would oﬀe rt h es a m eO D St o01 a n dt oa na m a t e u r
who can also not distinguish between states 2 and 3. The two amateurs are equivalent
because 01 takes the same decisions in states 2 and 3 a c c o r d i n gt oO D S 01.T h e b e s t
amateur is also not uniquely deﬁned when b<1/6: all pairs are payoﬀ-equivalent (and
are outperformed by the expert).
Proposition 3 asserts that the expert outperforms any amateur when b ≤ 1/2(T − 1),
and therefore whenever b just exceeds 1/2(T − 1). Table 1 reveals that an amateur who
cannot distinguish between states K − 2 and K − 1 outperforms the expert when b ∈
(b+,1/(T − 1)) for some b+ > 1/2(T − 1). This amateur corresponds to that used in
our proof of Proposition 3(ii). However, contrary to that construction, she takes diﬀerent
decisions than the expert in states 0 and 3 according to her ODS. This property conﬁrms
the importance of the second reason for appointing an amateur, as detailed in Section 6.1
25In Appendix C, we only describe details for amateurs who appear in our discussion below. We report
details for the omitted amateurs in Anesi and Seidmann (2011).
22above: the principal may relax the incentive constraints of an amateur in states outside
E by changing the decision which she takes in E. On the other hand, the best amateur
cannot distinguish between K − 1 and K when b>1/(T − 1) = 1/3: contrary to the
construction which we used to prove Proposition 3(ii).26 Furthermore, the principal oﬀers





Calculations in Appendix C.2 also reveal that the ODS for the principal’s ideal ex-
pertise always satisﬁes the chain property: generalizing the characteristics of the expert’s
ODS. In addition, the expert is never outperformed by an amateur who cannot distinguish
more than two states. These calculations also reveal that the agent is indiﬀerent between
being an expert and some amateur (01)i fb<1/3, and prefers to be an amateur (12)i f
1/3 <b<2/3.
Table 2 provides equivalent details for the ﬁve-state case, where the expert’s ODS
comprises ﬁve decisions when b<1/4, four decisions when b ∈ (1/4,3/8), three decisions
when b ∈ (3/8,1/2), and two decisions when b ∈ (1/2,5/8).
























8 01 01 and 02,14 and 012
b>5
8 All All
Table 2: T =5
Table 2 reveals various diﬀerences from the four-state case. The principal’s best ama-
teur outperforms the expert for some b<1/(T − 1) when T =4 ; Table 2 shows that this
is impossible when T =5 .
If the principal’s best amateur outperforms the expert then she cannot distinguish
between states K − 2 and K − 1 or between K − 1 and K,a si nt h eT =4case; but
in contrast, E switches between (K − 2)(K − 1) and (K − 1)K for this range of bias.
This non-monotonicity seems to occur because of the interplay of two eﬀects. If b is low
enough then E is low: for replacing the expert with amateur t(t+1)relaxes the incentive
26She again takes diﬀerent decisions than the expert in states 0 and 3 when oﬀered her ODS.
23constraint in state t+1, allowing the agent to take lower decisions in every state τ ≥ t+2,
which is advantageous to the principal because the expert takes decisions above τ/(T −1)
in each such state (cf. Corollary 1). On the other hand, the principal incurs extra losses
in some states τ<t +2 ; so the best amateur is not driven down to 01 when T =5 .
Two eﬀects occur as b increases. The number of decisions in the expert’s ODS for states
τ ≥ t +2falls, reducing the gain from relaxing incentive constraints in those states. On
the other hand, an amateur who cannot distinguish states above an expert’s K cannot
outperform an expert; so there is a countervailing eﬀect which starts to reduce the best
E. This non-monotonicity also extends to the number of decisions that the best amateur
takes: if 1
4 <b< 9
32 then 12 takes three decisions; and if 9
32 <b<1
3 then 23 takes four
decisions. (See Appendix C.3 for details.)
When T =4the ODS for the principal’s best agent satisﬁes the chain property. This
is no longer true with ﬁve states. Speciﬁcally, if 1/4 <b<9/32 then the principal’s
best amateur (12) strictly prefers the decision she takes in state 3 over the single decision
w h i c hs h et a k e si ns t a t e s3 and 4.27 The analogous ODS also fails the chain property when
9/32 <b<1/3.
While the principal’s best amateur cannot distinguish pairs of successive states, am-
ateur 123, who cannot distinguish three successive s t a t e s ,o u t p e r f o r m st h ee x p e r tw h e n
5/16 <b<1/3. We conjecture that the principal’s best amateur may be unable to
distinguish more than two states when T is large enough.
When T =4 ,t h eO D So ﬀered to each player’s ideal expertise is uniquely deﬁned for
generic bias. This property does not carry over when T =5 : various amateurs yield the
agent her minimal loss, and each of these agents is oﬀered a diﬀerent ODS. In further
contrast to the four state case, some of these agents cannot distinguish between more than
a pair of neighboring states.
We have noted above that the principal and agent top rank the same agent when b is
very low and when it is so high that delegation is not valuable. Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate
that this property carries over to intermediate bias. This strengthens Proposition 4 in two
senses: 01 is best for both players as well as prefered to the expert; and the same agent is
best for both players when b<1/2 and T =5 .
If there are four or ﬁve states then the agent prefers to be the expert for biases at
which the principal would appoint an amateur. The intuition is as follows. At the critical
b where the principal is indiﬀerent, the ODS for the amateur consists of fewer decisions
than the ODS for the expert, who takes a decision which is too high for the principal
in every state (cf. Corollary 1(i)). Reducing state-sensitivity is, ceteris paribus, bad for
the principal; so the amateur must take lower decisions in some states. As the expert’s
decisions are too low for the agent (cf. Corollary 1(ii)), she must be worse oﬀ when the
principal appoints the amateur.
27Consequently, the latter decision is ﬁrst best for the principal in those states.
247C o n c l u s i o n
A growing literature has built on Holmstrom’s (1984) uniform-quadratic model to explore
the decisions induced by an optimal mechanism without money transfers when the support
of states is an interval. The ODS in Holmstrom (1984) has a simple structure, which gen-
erates testable implications, like the Ally Principle. The literature has provided necessary
and suﬃcient conditions on preferences and the distribution of states for implications like
the Ally Principle.
Interval support alone implies that the ODS has a no-compromise property: the agent
must take her ideal decision in those states where her reaction function is locally increas-
ing (cf. Melumad and Shibano (1991)). We have extended the literature by studying
the implications of ﬁnite support: both because the support of states is ﬁnite (and some-
times small) in empirically salient situations, and because of both technical and testable
implications.
We have focused on the simplest extension of Holmstrom’s model: to emphasize the
implications of ﬁnite support in an otherwise well-understood structure; and, like various
papers in the literature, to exploit its tractability.
We have demonstrated that an expert’s ODS has a strikingly simple form, which is
characterized by two properties: top loading implies that the agent is indiﬀerent in low
enough states; while the chain property implies that the decision taken in those states
compromises between the principal’s and the agent’s ideal decisions. The chain property
implies that local variations in the agent’s bias shift the ODS uniformly upwards: a testable
feature which we have contrasted with the Ally Principle. We have also exploited the
simple structure of the ODS to apply our model to the choice of agents, demonstrating
that the Expertise Principle fails for intermediate bias, and characterizing the principal’s
and the agent’s best agents when there are few states.
The chain property and top loading rely on quadratic losses and equi-probable and
equi-spaced states. To see this, consider a generalization in which the three, equi-probable
states are 0, ε and 2,w h e r eε<4/7; and players incur the same losses as in our model.
































25The chain property fails for ε
4 <b<4−3ε
8 , when the agent takes the principal’s ideal
decision in some, but not all states. The agent only takes the same decision in states ε






4 − 3ε +
√
6ε2 − 18ε +3 6
8
):
so top loading fails.
While the ODS does not satisfy either the chain property or top loading, the agent
never takes her ideal decision; and any decision which is not ideal for the principal is
increasing in b. Consequently, any generic marginal increase in bias raises some decisions
and leaves the other decisions ﬁxed. In other words, comparative statics with respect to
the bias are similar to those in our model. We conjecture that these features generalize
to other cases with a ﬁnite support, upward biased agent and preferences which satisfy
single crossing: the agent never takes her ideal decision because the principal can exploit
the distance between the agent’s ideal decisions across states; and an increase in the bias
never reduces the decision taken in any state.
To see the latter, let b0 be just below b1,a n dw r i t e{dτ(bi)} for the ODS when the
bias is bi (i =0 ,1). Suppose, contrary to our claim, that there is a state t such that
dt(b1) <d t(b0). Optimality of both ODSs then implies that there is a state s<tat which
the agent with the lower bias strictly prefers dt(b1) over ds(b0); so single crossing implies
that ds(b0) <d s(b1).O p t i m a l i t yo f{dτ(b1)} then implies that the principal can proﬁtably
deviate when the bias is b0.
26APPENDIX A: Proof of Theorem 1
P r o o fo fL e m m a1
























, ∀i =0 ,...,s− 1.
Our ﬁrst step is to establish the existence of a solution to problem (P) by using the
Weierstrass Theorem. To do so, we must ensure that the objective function in (P) is
continuous, and that the collection of incentive-compatibility constraints deﬁnes a feasible
s e tt h a ti sc o m p a c ti nRs. While continuity of the principal’s loss function and closedness
of the feasible set are trivial (inequalities are weak and the agent’s loss function is always
continuous), the feasible set of (P) is obviously not bounded.















for each i =0 ,...,s− 1. To see this, suppose ﬁrst that some of the d∗
i’s are negative. In
such a situation, the principal can reduce her loss by replacing every d∗
i < 0 by di =0 .
Indeed, the agent would take decision 0 in every state i ≤ I ≡ max{i : d∗
i < 0},m a k i n g
the principal strictly better oﬀ. Moreover, the principal would also be better oﬀ in every
state i>Iin which the agent would take 0 instead of d∗
i > 0. This proves that d∗
i ≥ 0,
for each i =0 ,...,s− 1.
Furthermore, the incentive-compatibility constraint in state i +1 , i<s− 1 ,r e q u i r e s
that d∗
i ≤ b + s−1
T−1 whenever d∗
i <d ∗
i+1. Now, to show that the above inequality is also






and suppose that d∗
s−1 >b+ s−1
T−1.
This implies that the incentive-compatibility constraint in state τ must be satisﬁed with















τ ≥ 0, this implies that
d∗


















for each i =0 ,...,s− 1.






,m u s ts a t i s f y( 6 ) .
Consequently, problem (P0), obtained by adding the constraints (6) to (P), has the same
27solution(s) as (P) . The conditions in (6) guarantee that the feasible set of (P0) is bounded




























If K is the smallest integer such that DK+1 = ∅ then {δ∗
0,...,δ∗
K} is, by deﬁnition, an
optimal delegation set.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2
As ∆ is top loaded, the agent takes decision δt+τ in state t+τ,f o re v e r yτ<K ,a n dt a k e s
δt+K in states K ≤ t + τ ≤ s − 1.
For each τ ≤ K,l e tκt+τ ≡ δt+τ − t+τ
















κt+τ + κt+τ+1 =2 b −
1
T − 1
, ∀τ =0 ,...,K− 1 ;( 7 )
where the equality in (7) must hold at ∆ b e c a u s ei ts a t i s ﬁes the chain property. It is easy







t+τ +( s − K)
µ
κt+K −






subject to (7). From the incentive constraints (7), we obtain by recursion that
κt+τ =
½
κt if τ is even
2b − 1
T−1 − κt if τ is odd , ∀τ =0 ,...,K.
Substituting into (8), simple convex optimization reveals that, at an optimum:
κt =
½
 e(b,s,K) if K is even,
 o(b,s,K) if K is odd,
where  e(b,s,K) and  o(b,s,K) are deﬁned before Lemma 2 in Section 2.3.





– a contradiction to ∆ being optimal. More precisely, for










 (b,s,m − 1) + t+τ
T−1 if τ is even,
2b −  (b,s,m − 1) + t+τ−1
T−1 if τ is odd.




then there is K0 6= K such that the
principal can reduce his loss by oﬀering either D∗(K0 − 1) or D∗(K0 +1 )to the agent.
Suppose that K is even. The change in the principal’s loss following a deviation to
D∗(K +2 )when K<s− 1 can be decomposed as follows:
( i )I ne a c hs t a t et+τ,w i t hτ even and no more than K, the change in the principal’s
loss is:
 o(b,s,K +1 ) 2 −  e(b,s,K)2 = ϕ(b,s,K)[ϕ(b,s,K)+2  e(b,s,K)] ,
where
ϕ(b,s,K) ≡  o(b,s,K +1 )−  e(b,s,K)=
































(iii) In each state t + K + i, i =1 ,...,s− K − 1, the change in the principal’s loss is:
∙







































=( s − K − 1)
∙




=( K +1 )







=( K +1 ) ϕ(b,s,K) .
Thus, summing the changes in the principal’s loss over all states, we obtain
(K +1 ) ϕ(b,s,K)
∙






























29This proves that the deviation to D∗(K+2)is unproﬁtable only if b ≥ bmin(K,s).T h e
argument above also implies that the principal can proﬁtably deviate from D∗(K +2 )to
D∗(K +1 )unless b ≤ bmax(K +1 ,s)=bmin(K,s).
Analogous arguments imply (see the online Appendix for a detailed proof) that the






[b − bmax(K,s)] .
This proves that the deviation to D∗(K) is unproﬁtable only if b ≤ bmax(K,s).T h e
above argument also implies that the principal can proﬁtably deviate from D∗(K) to
D∗(K +1 )unless b ≥ bmin(K − 1,s)=bmax(K,s).
We have therefore proved that the principal can reduce his expected loss by choosing
D∗(K +2 )instead of ∆ when b<b min(K,s), and by choosing D∗(K) instead of ∆ when
b>b max(K,s). 28 As ∆ ∈ D∗





P r o o fo fL e m m a3
Suppose that (Hs) is true and that, contrary to the Lemma, some element of D∗
s+1,t(b),
say ∆∗, does not satisfy the chain property.
(Hs) and the optimality of ∆∗ imply that the chain can only break once. To see this,
note that there would otherwise be k1 and k2 such that the agent would strictly prefer
dt+τi(∆∗,b) to dt+τi+1(∆∗,b), i =1 ,2 in states t + τi = tki (∆∗,b), t ≤ τ1 <τ 2 ≤ t + s.
A brief inspection of problem of the principal’s optimization problem (see above) reveals
t h a tt h i sw o u l di nt u r ni m p l yt h a t∆∗ = ∆1 ∪ ∆2 ∪ ∆3,w h e r e∆1 ∈ D∗
τ1+1,t(b), ∆2 ∈
D∗
τ2−τ1,t+τ1+1(b),a n d∆3 ∈ D∗
s−1−τ2,τ2+1(b). But this would contradict ∆∗ ∈ D∗
s+1,t(b):
for (Hτ2+1) implies that (∆1 ∪ ∆2) / ∈ D∗
τ2+1,t(b); so the principal could reduce his expected
loss by replacing ∆∗ with (∆0
1 ∪ ∆3),w h e r e∆0
1 ∈ D∗
τ2+1,t(b).
In sum, there is a unique k such that the agent strictly prefers dt+τ−1(∆∗,b) over






















T−1 if K is even,
2b − 1
T−1 −  o(b,τ,K)+t+K





 e(b,s − τ +1 ,K0)+ t+τ
T−1 if K0 is even
 o(b,s − τ +1 ,K0)+ t+τ












28Note that we have ignored the case in which K = s−1 and b<b
min(K,s), since it implies b<1/2(T−1).
30To obtain the desired contradiction, we will use (12) to prove that (10) and (11) are
inconsistent with (9). Before we proceed any further, however, the following observations













Second, b ≥ (s − K)/2(T − 1) implies that, for any s and any K,












Combining these two observations with (10) and (11), we obtain
dt+τ−1 (∆∗
1)+dt+τ (∆∗
2) ≤ 2b −
1
T − 1
−  o(b,τ,K)+ e ¡
b,s − τ +1 ,K0¢
+














τ − K − 1
T − 1
+  o(b,τ,K) −  e ¡
b,s − τ +1 ,K0¢
.
Tedious calculations (available in the online Appendix) reveal that the right-hand side of
the above inequality is nonnegative when (12) is true. This implies that Υ(b) ≥ 0, contrary
to (9). As t ≤ T −s was chosen arbitrarily, this proves that the chain cannot break when
the agent is oﬀered an element of D∗
s+1,t(b), for every t ≤ T − s.
P r o o fo fL e m m a4
Let ∆ =( δt,...,δt+K) ∈ D∗
s,t(b) satisfy the chain property. First of all, in order to
simplify notation, we normalize t to 0. Thus, ∆ = {δ0,...,δK}. Moreover, in what follows
we will indulge in a slight abuse of notation and deﬁne Tk and tk as follows:
Tk ≡ {τ ∈ Ts,t : dτ (∆,b)=δk} ,
tk ≡ max{τ : τ ∈ Tk} .
for each k =0 ,...,K.






for every k<K .I f∆ is not top loaded then there is k<Ksuch that |Tk| > 1. By (13),
this implies that δk <b+ tk−1
T−1.A s∆ satisﬁes the chain property, this in turn implies that








What remains to be proved, therefore, is that (13) is true. We do so with a series of
claims.
Claim 1: δk+1 ≤ b + tk+1
T−1,∀k<K .
Let k<Kand suppose, contrary to Claim 1, that δk+1 >b+ tk+1
T−1.T h i si m p l i e st h a t




<δ k+1 ≤ b +
tk + q +1
T − 1
.
















We need to consider two cases separately:
• Case 1: Either k 6= K − 1 or tK−1 + q ≤ s − 1. Let υ>0 be such that the agent
is indiﬀerent between δk+1 and δk+1 − υ in state tk + q. Note that, by construction, this
implies that







and that the agent is indiﬀerent between δk and δk + υ in state tk − q.
Suppose now that the principal deviates from ∆ to ∆∪{δk + υ,δk+1 − υ}.T h ea g e n t
takes the same decisions in states {t : t ≤ tk − q or t ≥ tk + q +1 } as before the principal’s
deviation; now takes decision δk + υ in states {t : tk − q +1≤ t ≤ tk}; and now takes
decision δk+1 − υ in states {t : tk +1≤ t ≤ tk + q}.
We now decompose the change in the principal’s expected loss after his deviation.
First, the change in loss in states tk and tk + q is given by
µ















































where the third equality follows from (14).



























For each i =1 ,...,q− 1, the bracketed term is equal to
2υ
µ























32As a consequence, the deviation from ∆ is strictly proﬁtable to the principal: a con-
tradiction to ∆ being an ODS.
• Case 2: k = K −1 and tK−1 +q>s−1. Deﬁne ˜ υ such that the agent is indiﬀerent
between δK and δK −˜ υ in state s−1.L e t˜ q ≡ s−tK−1 −1. By construction, the agent is
indiﬀerent between δk and δk+˜ υ in state tK−1−˜ q. We can then repeat the same argument
as in Case 1 – just substitute ˜ q and ˜ υ for q and υ, respectively – to obtain the same
contradiction.
Claim 2: If δk+1 ≤ b + tk+1
T−1,∀k<Kthen δk+1 <b+ tk+1
T−1,∀k<K .
Suppose that there is k such that




To obtain a contradiction, we will ﬁrst prove that (15) implies that




for every 0 ≤ l<K . The chain property implies that
δk =2 b +
2tk
T − 1




From Claim 1, this in turn implies that tk − 1 is the smallest state in which the agent
takes δk. Indeed, if she took decision δk in state t<t k − 1 then










contrary to Claim 1; and if tk = tk−1 +1then δk−1 = b +
tk−1
T−1, contrary to the chain
property.
Consequently, tk−1 = tk − 2 and the agent is indiﬀerent between δk−1 and δk in state
tk − 2. This in turn implies that
δk−1 =2 b +
2tk−1
T − 1







where the last inequality follows from Claim 1.
We can then proceed recursively to obtain (16) for 0 ≤ l ≤ k. Furthermore,








δk+2 = b +






so that tk+1 ≤ tk +2 . But we must have tk+1 = tk +2for k<K− 1: for if not, then
tk+1 = tk +1 . This would imply that the agent takes her ideal decision, b + tk+1
T−1 = δk+1
33in state tk+1, and could therefore not be indiﬀerent between δk+1 and δk+2,c o n t r a r yt o
the chain property. Thus,







We can then proceed recursively to obtain (16) for k ≤ l ≤ K.
Combined with the chain property, (15) also implies that |Tk| =2for 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1,
and |Tk| ≤ 2 for k =0 ,K. We then distinguish between two cases:
• Case 1: |T0| =1 . In this case, the agent takes δ0 = b− 1
T−1 in state 0; takes decision
δi = b + 2i−1
T−1 in states 2i − 1 and 2i: for every 0 <i<K ;a n dt a k e sδK = b + 2K−1
T−1 at
every state in TK.
Note, also, that b ≥ 1
T−1 –e l s eδ0 < 0, and the principal could improve on ∆ by
raising δ0 –a n dt h a tK must be odd.
















,w h e r e
δ∗
t ≡ b +
2t − 1
2(T − 1)
: ∀t =0 ,...,s− 1 .









4(T − 1)2 <λ(∆,b) ,
contrary to the supposition that ∆ is an ODS.







,w h e r e
δ0
i = δi +ε if i is even, δ0
i = δi −ε if i is odd, and ε>0. The change in the principal’s loss
is then ε[(2K +1 ) ε − 2b], which is negative for every small enough ε: a contradiction.
• Case 2: |T0| =2 . In this case, the agent takes decision δi = b+ 2i
T−1 in states 2i and
2i +1 :f o re v e r yi =0 ,...,K− 1; and she takes decision δK = b + 2K
T−1 at states in TK.
Moreover, K must be even.
If |TK| =1then the change in the principal’s loss if he deviates to ∆0
ε (as deﬁned
above) is ε[(2K +1 ) ε − 2b], which is negative if ε is small enough.
If |TK| =2then s =2 ( K +1 )and the principal’s loss is


















4(T − 1)2 <λ(∆,b) :
34a contradiction. This completes the proof of Claim 2.
Combining Claims 1 and 2, we obtain (13).
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1
If b ≤ 1
2(T−1), the result is obvious. Suppose b> 1
2(T−1). Part (i) is a direct consequence
of (H2) and Lemmas 2-4. Note, however, that more is needed to establish parts (ii) and
(iii) because Lemma 2 only establishes necessity.
We know from Lemma 1 that there is an ODS for every b> 1
2(T−1).L e t ∆ be an
ODS. Deﬁne ∆∗(b,K) as the unique solution to the principal’s minimization problem in
(7): that is, ∆∗(b,K) is optimal among the delegation sets of cardinality (K+1)satisfying
the chain property and top loading.




, but that ∆ contains K0 +1decisions





contradiction. Consequently, ∆ must be equal to ∆∗(b,K) .
Now suppose that b = bmin(K,T). Applying Lemma 2, an ODS must contain either
K or K +1decisions. The computations in the proof of Lemma 2 reveal that, when
b = bmin(K,T), ∆∗(b,K) and ∆∗(b,K − 1) yield the same expected loss to the principal.
Therefore, D∗
T(b) consists of ∆∗(b,K − 1) and ∆∗(b,K). A parallel argument establishes
the result when b = bmax(K,T).
APPENDIX B: Proofs of Propositions, Corollaries and Ob-
servations
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1
Let ∆ ∈ D∗





(i) Necessity is easy to establish: If b ≤ 1
2(T−1) then the ﬁrst-best decision rule is





, ∀t ∈ T .
To establish suﬃciency, suppose that b> 1
2(T−1). Lemma 2 implies that we have to
show that  (b,T,K) > 0 if t is even, and 2b −  (b,T,K) > 1
T−1 if t is odd. We must
distinguish between four cases:
• Case 1: t even and K even.S i n c e e is strictly increasing in b (K<T ),




T − K − 1
2(T − 1)
for all b>b min(K,T).I f K<T− 1, we directly obtain the result from the equation
equation because b ≥ bmin(K,T).I f K = T − 1 then bmin(K,T)= 1
2(T−1);s ob>




35• Case 2: t odd and K even.S i n c e2b −  e(b,T,K) is strictly increasing in b,









for all b>b min(K,T). The argument is then the same as in Case 1.
• Case 3: t even and K odd.S i n c e o is strictly increasing in b,




T − K − 1
2T
for all b>b min(K,T). The argument is then the same as in Case 1.
• Case 4: t odd and K odd.S i n c e2b −  o(b,T,K) is strictly increasing in b,









for all b>b min(K,T). The argument is then the same as in Case 1.
(ii) Let ∆ = {δ0,...,δK}.F o re v e r yt ∈ T,t h e r ei sk such that t ∈ Tk+1(∆,b).C l a i m s








(iii) This follows immediately from the requirement that the agent be indiﬀerent
between δ0 and δ1 in state 0.
(iv) The condition in the premise implies that the ODS contains T decisions, the largest
of which is 1 if b =1 /2(T −1),a n dm u s to ﬀer a larger decision when the bias is larger, but
small enough that the ODS contains T decisions. The agent must be indiﬀerent between
the two highest decisions in state T−2
T−1 for bias in this range; so dT−2(∆,b) <b+ T−2
T−1 < 1.
Now suppose that b>1/(T − 1),s oK<T− 1. The second highest decision in the
ODS is then bounded above by the limit of δK−1 as b approaches T−K+1
2(T−1) .W ec a ns h o w
that the principal expects to lose less if the agent takes decision δK−1 than if she takes
any decision above 1, conditional on the state being at least K/(T −1). Consequently, the
maximal decision in an ODS must be less than 1 whenever b>1/(T − 1).
P r o o fo fO b s e r v a t i o n1
We distinguish between two cases:
(a) b>1/2. In this case, we have b>1
2 =l i m T→∞
T
2(T−1).C o n s e q u e n t l y , b>
T/2(T − 1) for large enough T. Theorem 1 then implies that there is a unique ODS,
namely {1/2}, as in Holmstrom’s model.
36(b) b ∈ (0,1/2].A sT/2(T − 1) is a strictly decreasing function that converges to 1/2







, ∀T ∈ N . (17)
For every T ∈ N,l e t
e K(T) ≡
½








Lemma 2, Theorem 1, and (17) imply that, for every T and every ∆∗
T(b) ∈ D∗
T(b),t h e r e
exists KT ∈ e K(T) such that ∆∗





T−1 if τ is even,
2b −  (b,T,KT)+ τ−1
T−1 if τ is odd,
where   is deﬁned before Lemma 2 in Section 2.3.
We want to prove that each ∆∗
T(b) ∈ D∗
T(b) becomes arbitrarily close to ∆∗
∞(b) as
T →∞ . T od os o ,w ew i l ld e c o m p o s eD∗
T(b) as follows: D∗
T(b)=De
T(b) ∪ Do
T(b),w h e r e
De
T(b) [resp. Do
T(b)]i st h ec l a s so fO D S s∆∗
T(b)={δ0,...,δKT} such that KT is even
[resp. odd].
Suppose, ﬁrst, that ∆∗
T(b) ∈ De





































{ e (b,T,KT)} + ET¢[µ½











T − KT +1
2(T − 1)
and therefore
T − 2(T − 1)b ≤ KT ≤ T − 2(T − 1)b +1. (19)
This in turn implies that






T − 2(T − 1)b +1
T − 1
.
Since both the left-hand and right-hand sides of this inequality converge to 1 − 2b,w e
obtain that KT/(T −1) and (KT −1)/(T −1) converge to 1−2b as T →∞ . This in turn
implies that both ET and OT converge to the interval [0,1 − 2b] as T →∞ .
37The deﬁnition of  e and (19) imply that






T − 2(T − 1)b +1
T
b ,
where the left-hand and right-hand sides converge to (1 − 2b)b as T becomes arbitrarily
large. This proves that KT
T b also converges to (1 − 2b)b as T →∞ . Using (19) again, we
obtain









where the left-hand and right-hand side both approach 4b2/2=2 b2. T h i sp r o v e st h a t
(T−KT)2
2T(T−1) converges to 2b2 as T →∞ .
Thus,  e (b,T,KT), and therefore 2b− e (b,T,KT), converge to b as T →∞ . By (18),
the limit of ∆∗
T(b) c a nt h e nb ee x p r e s s e da s
({b} +[ 0 ,1 − 2b]) ∪ ({b} +[ 0 ,1 − 2b]) .
We have therefore proved that every ∆∗
T(b) ∈ De
T(b) converges to [b,1 − b] –w h i c hi s
equal to ∆∗
∞(b) –a sT →∞ .
A parallel argument shows that every ∆∗
T(b) ∈ Do
T(b) converges to ∆∗
∞(b) as T →∞ .
This proves that limT→∞ ∆∗
T(b)=∆∗
∞(b) for all ∆∗
T(b) ∈ D∗
T(b).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
We start with small changes. Theorem 1 implies that the agent is indiﬀerent between







small enough increase in b leaves K ﬁxed at K0. However, the agent now strictly prefers
δt+1 over δt; so the principal must increase the t’th and/or the next highest decision in
the ODS to restore the agent’s indiﬀerence in state t. Theorem 1 implies that the ODS
varies continuously for increases in bias in this range. In sum, if K0 > 0 (so delegation is
valuable) then a small enough increase in b from a generic starting point shifts the ODS
to the right.
Now consider the principal’s loss at a critical value of b,s a ybmax(K,T).T h e c h a i n
property implies that the principal then makes the same loss in states t ≥ K if the agent
takes δK−1 or δK;s o{δ0,...,δK−1} is also an ODS at this critical bias. Thus, a marginal






, induces the principal to drop δK from the







This property mimics the reduction in discretion in the continuous-state model.
Consider an increase in bias from b0 to b1 which is large enough that ∆(b1) contains
fewer decisions than ∆(b0). Although ∆(b0) and ∆(b1) are not ordered by discretion,
the principal oﬀers more decisions to a less biased agent. We will now argue that a large
38enough increase in b reduces the maximal decision and raises the minimal decision in the
ODS.
We start with the ﬁr s tc l a i m .I ti ss u ﬃcient to show that an increase in b which reduces
the number of decisions from K0 +1to K0 reduces the maximal decision.
If K0 is even then the requisite condition is equivalent to
 e (b0,T,K 0)+
K0
T − 1








<b 0 <b 1 <
T − K0 +2
2(T − 1)
,
which implies that the condition holds.
If K0 is odd and K0 > 1 then the requisite condition is equivalent to
2b0 −  o(b0,T,K 0) >  e(b0,T,K 0 − 1)
which, on rearrangement, yields b1−b0 < 1/(T −1). The bounds on b0 and b1 above imply
that this condition holds. If K0 =1then Theorem 1 directly implies that δ1 > 1/2.T h e s e
observations imply our claim that the maximal decision in ∆(b1) exceeds the maximal
decision in ∆(b0) whenever b1 −b0 is large enough that the principal reduces the number
of decisions in the ODS.
We will now argue that the minimal decision in ∆(b1) exceeds the minimal decision in
∆(b0) by considering an increase in b which reduces the number of decisions from K0 +1
to K0. The argument requires us to distinguish between cases in which K0 is odd and
even. In the latter case, Lemma 2 implies that the minimal decision in ∆(b1) exceeds the

















K0(T − K0 +1 )
2(T − 1)
and (2T − K0)b1 ≥
(2T − K0)(T − K0 +1 )
2(T − 1)
.
Substituting above yields the requisite inequality.
If K0 is odd then Lemma 2 implies that the minimal decision in ∆(b1) exceeds the
minimal decision in ∆(b0) i fa n do n l yi f











(2T − K0 − 1)b0 ≤
(2T − K0 − 1)(T − K0 +1 )
2(T − 1)
and (K0 − 1)b1 ≥
(K0 − 1)(T − K0 +1 )
2(T − 1)
.
Substituting above yields the requisite inequality.
This pair of observations implies our claim that the minimal decision in ∆(b1) exceeds
the minimal decision in ∆(b0).
39P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
(i) Replacing the expert with an amateur must make the agent’s decisions less state-
sensitive; so the expert must outperform any amateur if the agent would take ﬁrst-best
decisions in every state: that is, when b ≤ 1
2(T−1).
If b> T
2(T−1) then the principal loses T2+T
12(T−1)2 if he delegates to an expert. The
principal can improve on appointing an expert if and only if he can oﬀer some amateur a
two-decision delegation set.
Suppose that the principal oﬀers {δ0,δ1} to an amateur, who takes δ0 i fa n do n l yi f
the state is in E ≡ {0,...,τ − 1}. The principal is then best oﬀ if the amateur cannot
distinguish between the states in E, and is indiﬀerent between δ0 and δ1:s o






















































relevant range. We will argue that the principal is indiﬀerent between appointing the
e x p e r ta n da na m a t e u rw h e nb = T/2(T − 1), which will then imply that the expert

























The expert takes decision 1/2 in all states; so the amateur outperforms the expert when


























Rearranging terms reveals that L(τ)=0for every τ, proving this part.
(ii) Suppose, ﬁrst, that 1
T−1 <b<1
2,a n dl e t∆ = {δ0,...,δK} ∈ D∗
T(b).T h e o r e m1
implies that K>1.
Let E denote the event {K −2,K−1}, and consider an amateur who can distinguish
between every state except for those in E.D e ﬁne δE as the decision which leaves this
amateur indiﬀerent with δK in event E:v i z .




40For ﬁxed T, we need to distinguish between cases in which K is odd and K is even.


























4KT − 5T − K2 − T2
2T(T − 1)
>δ K−2 ,
where the inequality implies that the agent prefers δK−3 over δE in state K − 3.





























Now suppose that the principal oﬀers an amateur a delegation set identical to ∆,
except that δK−2 and δK−1 are replaced by δE. By construction, the amateur takes the
same decision as the expert except in event E,w h e r es h et a k e sδE. The principal’s loss in






































































(T − K)2 − T
2T(T − 1)
> 0
because δK−2 = dK−2(∆,b) > K−2
T−1 (by Corollary 1).
41There are two cases to consider. If the left-hand side of (20) is positive then (21)
implies that the principal prefers to appoint this amateur and oﬀer her δE;a n di ft h e
left-hand side of (20) is negative then









(T − K)2 − T
2T(T − 1)
if and only if b>1/(T − 1). We therefore conclude that the principal prefers to appoint
this amateur and oﬀer her δE if b>1/(T − 1).









2T − K − 1
T
b −











2T − K − 1
T
b +
4KT − 5T − K2 − T2 +1
2T(T − 1)
<δ K−2 ,
where the last inequality exploits b<T−K+1
2(T−1) , and implies that the agent must take a
decision δ ≥ δK−2 in event E if she continues to take δt in states t<K− 2.
If δ = δK−2 then the amateur outperforms the expert if and only if the principal prefers
the agent to take δK−2 rather than δK−1 in state K − 1:t h a ti s ,w h e nb>1/(T − 1).
Now 1
T−1 < T−K
2(T−1) = bmin(K,T) if and only if K<T− 1: so the amateur outperforms













:s oK =1(by Theorem 1). The expert
would take
2(T−1)
T b − 1
2 in state 0,a n d 2
T b + 1

































Consider an amateur who can’t distinguish between states 0 and 1. A principal who oﬀers

























































Consequently, this amateur strictly outperforms the expert if and only if T>3.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
Proof We denote the amateur who cannot distinguish between states 0 and 1 as 01.W e
start by arguing that the ODS for agent 01 cannot contain more than two decisions:
Suppose otherwise, and let the agent take δK−1 in states τ = t +1 ,...,u,a n dδK in
states τ = u+1,...,T−1,w h e r eu>1. If the principal deviated to oﬀering {δ0,...,δK−1}
then the agent would take the same decisions in states τ ≤ u;s oT times the diﬀerence
between the principal’s loss with the new DS and the loss with the putative ODS equals
(δK−1 − δK)
"







≤ (δK−1 − δK)
∙
(T − 1 − u)(2b +
2u
T − 1











where the weak inequality follows from δK−1 <δ K and the supposition that the agent
takes δK−1 in state u, and the strict inequality follows from b>1/2. Consequently, the
ODS for 01 cannot contain more than two decisions.





T + t − 1
2(T − 1)
= δ1
for some state t ≥ 1. However, the agent would then take δ1 in state t because b>1/2
implies that
T + t − 1
2(T − 1)
<






Consequently, the ODS for 01 satisﬁes the chain property.
We now argue that the ODS for 01 must induce the agent to take δ1 in every state
t>1. To see this suppose, per contra, that the ODS for 01 (say, ∆) induces the agent
to take δ0 in every state τ<tfor some t>1.T h ee x p e r ta n d 01 would take the same
decision in each state if they were each oﬀered ∆. Theorem 1 implies that the principal
could improve on ∆ by oﬀering ∆∗ to the expert, who would therefore outperform 01,
contrary to Proposition 3(ii).


































































+( T − 2)δ1
µ












































































b2 > 0 .
APPENDIX C: Examples
C.1 The three-state case
44Suppose that the set of states is {0, 1
2,1}. The Table below describes the ODS (∆∗)
and the loss incurred by the principal (λ∗)a n dt h ee x p e r t( Λ∗)f o rg e n e r i cb i a s :









































6 b2 + 1
6
There are four possible amateurs: 01, 12, 02 and 012.W r i t e∆E for the ODS for an
amateur who cannot distinguish between states in some collection of events E;w r i t eλE
and ΛEfor the losses incurred by the principal and agent respectively. We then have


























6 b2 + 1
6
and



























6 b2 + 1
6
If E = {0,2} or E = {0,1,2} then the agent must take the same decision in every
state; so the agent takes 1/2 in every state.
These calculations imply that the principal appoints an expert when delegation is
valuable, conﬁrming our claim in the discussion following Proposition 3. On the other
hand, the agent strictly prefers to be an expert when b<1/2, and is otherwise indiﬀerent
between being an expert and an amateur who cannot distinguish between states t and
t +1 .
C.2 The four-state case
Suppose that the set of states is {0, 1
3, 2
3,1}. In contrast to the three-state case, we
only report the ODS and losses for agents mentioned in the text. We report the analogous
statistics for other amateurs in Anesi and Seidmann (2011).
45The Table below describes the ODS and the loss incurred by the principal and the
expert for generic bias:
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3 b − 1
6,b+ 1










36 b2 + 5
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If E = {1,2} then








2 b − 1
4,b+ 1
4,b+ 3

























36 b2 + 5
36
C.3 The ﬁve-state case
Suppose that the set of states is {0, 1
4, 1
2, 3
41}. As in the last subsection, we only report
the ODS and losses for agents mentioned in the text. We report the analogous statistics
for other amateurs in Anesi and Seidmann (2011).
The Table below describes the ODS and the loss incurred by the principal and the
expert for generic bias:














































































8 b2 + 1
8
If E = {0,1} then










































































8 b2 + 1
8
If E = {12} then








































































8 b2 + 1
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47If E = {2,3} then
b ∆23 λ23 Λ23
b< 3





























































8 b2 + 1
8
If E = {0,1,2} then










































8 b2 + 1
8
If E = {1,2,3} then











































8 b2 + 1
8
If E = {0,1},{2,3} then


















































8 b2 + 1
8
48If E = {0,2},{1,4} then













































8 b2 + 1
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